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ABSTRACT 
Singapore and China are two countries hit hard by the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome epidemic (SARS) in 2003. This study investigates how the two nation's leading 
newspapers, the People's Daily (China) and the Straits Times (Singapore) covered the 
outbreak, and analyzed the risk communication strategies employed by the two governments 
in dealing with SARS. 
Using content analysis, this study found that the Singapore paper reported the 
epidemic early, was more transparent with its coverage, and relied more on the use of health, 
economic, human interest, risk and morality frames to discuss the epidemic. On the other 
hand, the People's Daily reported the threat late, hid the real national situation from its 
audiences, and employed more political and responsibility frames in its SARS reports. The 
two newspapers cited government officials and local health reports the most as sources of 
information in their discourse about SARS. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
On February 15, 2003, Chinese health authorities reported to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) 305 cases of a pneumonia-like illness in Guangdong province that 
people had been complaining about since November of the previous year. WHO officer Carlo 
Urbani called the condition severe acute respiratory syndrome or SARS, caused by a 
previously unrecognized corona virus called SARS-CoV. The disease is accompanied by 
either pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome. Within 19 days, Urbani, who identified 
the first SARS case, died after contracting the disease. 
Because there were no vaccines or treatment for the disease at the time of the 
outbreak, the SARS epidemic spread like wildfire. Within a week after a global alert was 
released by WHO in March 12, 2003, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Vietnam 
successively reported SARS cases. Although from a medical perspective, a 14% case fatality 
is not high compared to that of smallpox, the SARS epidemic caused worldwide anxiety and 
fear. 
By late July 2003, in the absence of newly reported cases, the WHO declared that the 
global outbreak had been contained. It reported that from November 1, 2002 to July 31, 
2003, the total number of probable SARS cases worldwide reached 8,098; the confirmed 
death toll was 774 (WHO, 2003). 
Although the first SARS case was recorded as early as November 2002 in China, it 
was not until April 2, 2003 that the country allowed world health experts to visit Guangdong, 
the province where the first SARS case was observed. On April 6, 2003, Chinese Premier 
Win Jiabao proclaimed in a national broadcast that the country was capable of controlling the 
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spread of SARS, and declared that China was safe for travelers. He made this proclamation 
fully aware that hundreds of SARS cases had already been reported nationwide. Obviously, 
the epidemic was far from being under control at that time. On April 20, the health ministry 
in Beijing suddenly raised the number of confirmed SARS cases significantly, even admitting 
that more than 300 cases had not been accounted for. It was not until SARS spread 
throughout Beijing a full five months after the outbreak that the official Chinese media 
began to report news related to SARS. By that time, SARS was already threatening every big 
city in the country. 
To contain the epidemic, the government canceled one of the country's biggest 
national holidays, the week-long May 1st International Workers' Day celebrations. As a 
result, Chinese citizens sunk into deep anxiety and fear, something many of them had never 
experienced before. 
Of the several Asian countries plagued by the epidemic in 2003, China was hit the 
hardest. Before the outbreak of SARS in the first quarter of 2003, China was experiencing an 
unprecedented economic boom in six years, registering a 9.9 percent growth with more than 
$13 billion in foreign investments. Following the rash of SARS cases in the second quarter of 
the year, economic growth sunk to its slowest pace. The nation's gross domestic product 
dropped 6.7 percent from April to June 2003, the lowest recorded GDP since 1992. Many 
industries, especially in the service sector, suffered business losses. In Beijing, sales dropped 
10 percent, the biggest decline since 1984. Foreign tourist arrivals declined by 94 percent. 
To China, the SARS epidemic was not simply a public health problem. Indeed, the 
disease caused the most severe social-political crisis for the Chinese leadership since the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown (Huang, 2003). However, "the pattern of the Chinese 
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government's response to SARS was shaped by the institutional dynamics of the country's 
political system" (p. 130). 
The world's media have criticized the Chinese government and, by extension, its 
media, for their silence about the outbreak. Five months after the first SARS case was 
diagnosed in China, the government did not release any information about the new disease. 
People were kept in the dark amidst a national health crisis. Not knowing what they were 
dealing with, people were unable to protect themselves from infection. Consequently, the 
disease spread rapidly throughout China and eventually became uncontrollable. 
When the Chinese government finally started releasing SARS information to the 
public through the media it controls, citizens already knew the government hid the truth from 
them for more than five months. Yuan (2003) argues that although the economy has taken a 
severe hit, the greatest casualty has been the Chinese government's credibility at home and 
abroad. Epstein (2003) adds: "The crisis has cast a glaring spotlight on the government's 
secretive and often-duplicitous officials, its lack of accountability, its tightening grip on 
information and its inadequate public services" (p. 2). 
Indeed, SARS exposed the shortcomings of crisis management institutions in China. 
Establishing a modern crisis management mechanism is therefore an urgent task. If SARS 
stayed unabated for many months, it could have crippled the fast-growing economy. China is 
now at a critical stage in its economic and social transformation. An unexpected health crisis, 
if not handled properly, may lead to social upheavals. 
Another Asian country, Singapore, also succumbed to the epidemic. When its first 
SARS case was recorded on March 13, 2003, the Ministry of Health immediately issued a 
public medical alert. One week after the first case was registered in Singapore, the 
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government decided to centralize all probable cases of SARS in Tan Tock Seng Hospital to 
lessen the probability of spread. Two and a half months after that, Singapore was removed 
from the WHO list of affected countries. Thus, the SARS epidemic was already under control 
in Singapore eleven weeks after the first case was found. 
What Singapore employed to deal with SARS represents the state-of-the-art in risk 
communication (Sandman, 2003). According to Lanard and Sandman (2003), the most 
important recommendation in dealing with an evolving crisis is to avoid over reassuring the 
public. They elaborated: "Acknowledging uncertainty rather than claiming to be confident, 
using anticipatory guidance and emotional rehearsal to help people get used to what may 
happen; treating emotional reactions with respect rather than contempt; sharing dilemmas so 
people come to understand the pros and cons of difficult pending decisions and offering 
suggestions for things people can do themselves" (p. 1) are significant strategies that risk 
communicators can employ in dealing with a health crisis of international proportions. 
When several Asian countries warned people not to travel to Singapore, Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong did not take offense, saying his government also advised 
Singaporeans not to visit affected places. In contrast, when the WHO imposed a travel alert 
on Canada, Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman lashed out: "I've never been angrier in my life !" 
While others scoffed at the practice of wearing face masks to reduce the infection, Goh 
likened the practice to the Japanese custom of wearing masks when they catch a cold, a 
prudent protection practice. 
Although the Singapore government guided its people through the crisis, government 
officials also acknowledged feeling afraid of SARS publicly. As such, the people felt their 
government understood their fear and shared their anxiety. The result was a public willing to 
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cooperate with the government in its efforts to curb SARS. 
Because the public often first hears about risk information from the mass media, the 
media play a major role in shaping the public's view of risk. To administrators, technical and 
health professionals and communication specialists, the mass media are "key providers, 
interpreters, gatekeepers or channels of risk related information" (Lundgren and McMakin, 
2004, p. 271). It is important for the media to report balanced and reliable ri sk information. 
Otherwise, constructive public engagement becomes more difficult (Lamson and Modigliani, 
1989). 
The Singapore media reported the SARS epidemic transparently and was 
consequently praised by the WHO. However, the Chinese media have been criticized for 
their silence about the outbreak and for failing to expose the failure of its own government to 
protect its citizens. In a communique to Asia Times Online, Fung (2003) wrote: "In risk-
management terms, Singapore is singularly well positioned to respond to the SARS 
epidemic. For managing urgent health problems, you can't beat a country like Singapore that 
knows it can't hide the problem but genuinely can respond as strenuously as needed so that 
good risk management isn't such a surprise." 
Because the media need to provide accurate and timely information to citizens in 
times of crisis, the degree of freedom they possess is important in the free flow of risk-related 
information. Singapore and China are two countries whose governments have tight control 
over the media. Hence, the media's role in providing "the extralegal check on government" 
common in many Western countries is generally in question. 
As the official newspaper of the Communist Party, the People's Daily provides direct 
information about the policies and viewpoints of the government. All articles it publishes 
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must first be approved by the central government. On the other hand, Singapore's ruling 
People's Action Party controls most of the newspapers, including the Straits Times, the 
biggest and most dominant newspaper in the country. The SARS reports from these two 
newspapers, therefore, reflect the governments' strategies and policies on the epidemic. 
This study aims to compare the two newspapers' response to the SARS crisis to 
begin an examination of the role of the media in ri sk communication. What were the 
differences and similarities of news coverage in China and Singapore regarding the SARS 
crisis? Did the media give this issue considerable coverage to inform the public about the 
SARS epidemic? What government strategies were applied in handling the crisis as presented 
in the newspaper stories? The results of this study are intended to assist health 
communication practitioners and risk communication experts in developing effective risk 
communication strategies that will assist nations in dealing with a health crisis like SARS. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATI;TRE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Sandman (1993), ri sk is "hazard +outrage." "Hazard" is considered as 
the technical component of risk, the product of probability and magnitude. "Outrage," on the 
other hand, is the non-technical component of risk, an amalgam of perceived risk 
voluntariness, control, responsiveness, trust and dread (p. 1). Sandman (1993) identified four 
kinds of risk of which crisis constitutes the highest level. This study considers the SARS 
epidemic in 2003 as possessing the characteristics of crisis situations that involve a high-
level risk. 
In this study, risk communication refers to "the exchange of information and opinions 
concerning ri sk and risk-related factors among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers and 
other interested parties" (Food and Agriculture Organization and the WHO, 1998, p. 5). As 
one of the most important sources of information about risks, the media play an important 
role in risk communication. This study examines the media's coverage of the SARS crisis 
from a risk communication perspective. 
To many, the media are the most important sources of information about risks. From 
newspapers to the Internet, the media play a major role in influencing public risk perceptions. 
Generally, there are four functions of the media in a health crisis: "(1) to channel local public 
health information by connecting public health officials to citizens, and, to a lesser extent, 
serve as a channel for public health information between groups of professional stakeholders; 
(2) to provide a national and international conduit for news reports and analysis; (3) to 
document the economic impact of the crisis on businesses, front line health workers and the 
community as a whole; and (4) to offer a venue for public and political debate on the 
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handling of the crisis" (Feldman, Drache and Clifton, 2003, p. 7). 
To study how the People's Daily and the Straits Times reported SARS epidemic, three 
elements (information richness, risk messages and information sources) were examined in 
this study. 
Information richness 
In this study, "information richness" refers to the quantity of SARS information 
present in each news story. During the health risk communication process, the most 
important responsibility of the media is to provide accurate, timely, and sufficient 
information about the disease. For a new disease like SARS, the public expects the media to 
inform them about the new disease and to explain how the disease spreads, among others. 
For example, researchers found that the lack of public information about AIl~S hampered the 
development of treatment and prevention practices. The lack of medical information about 
SARS prevented citizens from taking precautionary measures against infection. In a very 
short time, the new and highly infectious disease caused worldwide panic. 
Clearly, information is needed for citizens to make informed judgments about a 
health threat. Ali (2003) found that uncertainty and fear dominated the media's coverage of 
SARS in most Asian countries. The media reports exaggerated the dangers associated with 
the disease, giving people the perception that it was much more dangerous than it actuality is. 
When people do not have first-hand experience with a disease, they tend to rely more on 
media reports (Petts, et al., 2002). What is the risk of being affected? What are the 
symptoms of the disease? What can they do to reduce the risk of infection? People are 
demanding more and better information form the mass media. News reports must therefore 
communicate "the magnitude of the threat, the symptoms of the threat, and measures that can 
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reduce the chance of being affected by the threat" (Roche and Muskavitch, 2003, p. 355). For 
many diseases that have the potential to burst into an epidemic, people need to know: (1) 
what it is, (2) how it gets transmitted, (3) its symptoms, (4) the risks of contracting it, and (5) 
where people can go for assistance. These are basic but essential bits of information people 
need to make intelligent assessments of how to deal with a health crisis. 
Risk messages 
According to Brown (2003), a risk message is a written, verbal or visual statement 
containing information about risks. They may not necessarily include advice about risk 
reduction behaviors. 
Meaning is not inherent in information and scientific knowledge should be interpreted 
to make it "real" to the public (Johnson, 1992). Since risk information is usually complex, a 
risk message should express clearly the probabilities of hazard and exposure so that they 
combine with psychometric processes in useful ways and offer a complete perspective of the 
Issue. 
Information sources 
Information sources are one of the factors that determine the quality and quantity of 
media content. According to Gans (1979), information sources are "the actors whom 
journalists observe or interview, including interviewees who appear on the air or who are 
quoted in articles" (p. 80). Although there are many possible sources for a specific issue, 
journalists do not contact all sources equally. Because those with economic and political 
power are more likely to influence journalists than other sources (Gans, 1979), it is important 
to ascertain who were being cited in news reports as expert ornon-expert sources of 
information. To Covello (1993), good risk communication is established, in large part, when 
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audiences perceive the communicator to be trustworthy and believable. The factors affecting 
trust and credibility include: empathy and caring, competence and expertise, honesty and 
openness, and dedication and commitment. Communicators and managers, therefore, should 
try their best to gain people's trust because once credibility is lost, it is difficult to regain. 
Risk communication strategies 
Early studies on risk communication mainly contrasted the viewpoints of experts and 
the public regarding what constitutes risk. This is just the first step, according to Sandman 
(1994), because risk communication aims "to reduce the gap between risks as the experts see 
it and risks as the public sees it" (p. 1). The function is crucial because more often than not, 
scientific ri sk assessment differs from public risk perception (Whitfield, 1997). 
According to Sandman (1994), the core words about risk communication are "watch 
out" and "stop worrying." When experts think hazards are really serious but people ignore 
them, the risk communicators should try to get people's attention and persuade them to take 
the risk seriously. Conversely, when experts think hazards are not as serious as people think 
they are, the goal of risk communication is to calm people down and persuade them that the 
ri sk i s smaller than they think. 
Increasingly, researchers have been paying more attention to the limitations of 
technical risk assessments and risk management practices, which greatly changed the nature 
of risk communication research and application. The focus of risk communication has thus 
shifted from "educating an irrational public" to "exchanging information and opinions" 
(Belloc, 2005). 
For the National Research Council (NRC, 1989), ri sk communication is "an 
interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, groups, and 
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institutions" (p. 1). It often involves multiple messages about the nature of risk, expressing 
concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk messages, or to legal and institutional arrangements 
for management. The fundamental goal of risk communication is to provide useful 
information to the target audience. Effective ri sk communication aims to reduce anxiety and 
fear as well as provide suggestions for risk assessment and the process of risk management. 
According to an FA®/WHO report (1998), the goals of risk communication are to: 
"l. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the risk communication process; 
2. Promote awareness and understanding of the specific issues under consideration 
during the risk analysis process; 
3. Promote consistency and transparency in arriving at and implementing risk 
management decisions; 
4. Foster public trust and confidence in risk management; and 
5. Exchange information among interested parties" (p. 4). 
A number of risk communication principles have been developed to accomplish these 
core objectivities. Among them are: (1) Knowing the audience because the audience should 
be analyzed to understand their opinions; (2) Involving the scientific experts because 
scientific experts are responsible for related knowledge; (3) Establishing expertise in 
communication because successful risk communication requires special experts in conveying 
information clearly and precisely to citizens; (4) Being a credible source of information; (5) 
Sharing responsibility; (6) Differentiating between science and value judgment; (7) Assuring 
transparency; and (8) Putting the risk in perspective. 
According to Rowan (1996), risk communication is "more successful when people 
are empowered than when they are manipulated or coerced. Experts should understand public 
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concern and values, express a commitment to dialogue and power sharing, and develop 
accurate risk assessment information" (p. 1). 
Risk communication is a relatively new area of study. Though researchers have 
developed a set of principles for good risk communication, the current limited number of 
empirical research is not enough to find a "right solution" to handle each case (Lundgren and 
McMakin, 2004). 
Risk communication and the mass media 
Scholars have studied a set of risk communication failures, such as the case of mad 
cow disease in Europe, dioxins in America and polychlorinated biphenyls or PCBs in Canada 
and in the Far North in search of better risk communication strategies. In 1986, Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, was first discovered in 
the United Kingdom. From the mid-1980s to 1990, the British government insisted that meat 
and other products from cattle infected with BSE pose no risk to humans despite continued 
public concerns about BSE's impact on people's health. In 1995, a 19-year-old male died 
from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease or CJD, a rare brain disease scientists have linked to BSE. In 
the face of public unease, the government announced "there is no evidence that BSE can 
cause CJD in humans." By November 1995, although many similar cases were reported in 
the media, the government did little to prevent the public from consuming beef. There was no 
scientific basis for banning beef, it proclaimed, and insisted that mad cow would be 
eradicated soon in Britain. 
On March 20, 1996, when British Health Secretary Stephen Dowell publicly admitted 
that scientists had indeed found the link between CJD and BSE, the British beef market 
collapsed overnight. The European Union summarily banned the export of British beef so 
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that by 1996, beef consumption dropped 11 percent across the European Union. Franz 
Fischler, the EU's Agricultural Commissioner at that time, considered BS1E the biggest crisis 
in the history of the European Union. 
Like SARS, mad cow is a severe disease that caused huge economic and political 
repercussions. Some of the risk communication lessons of the mad cow crisis were : (1) Do 
not over assure citizens; (2) Treat frightened people with compassion and understanding, not 
contempt; (3) Release bad news immediately; (4) Lack of openness leads to public mistrust 
of government; (5) Involve critics and opposing voices; and (6) Acknowledge misbehavior 
and apologize (Ratzan, 1998; Sandman, 2000). Powell and Leiss (1997) observed that risk 
communication is serious business, and that failures in ri sk communication practices are 
costly. A risk communication vacuum is an important factor in the social amplification of risk 
so that regulators must recognize from the beginning that the "no risk messages" position is 
always untenable. 
Compared to the British government's handling of mad cow disease, the Chinese 
government made a similar mistake in dealing with the SARS epidemic. 'The initial failure to 
inform the public fostered widespread anxiety and speculations. If there had been greater 
openness about the disease, the people at risk might have taken precautions to avoid 
infection. The mass media, therefore, have a role to play in fostering effective risk 
communication. 
Journalists play two crucial functions in health crisis situations. (1) They interpret 
scientific information and government policies to the public and (2) they reflect public 
concerns to the national leadership. Journalists face two problems in reporting risk. First, the 
process of risk assessment is complicated and confusing, making it hard for reporters to 
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explain and simplify risk information to the public. Second, reporters usually "do not know 
the subtleties involved in risk assessment and the type of questions they need to ask to 
effectively relate risk issues to the public" (Friedman, 2004, p. 2). To perform their tasks 
well, health reporters should be more cautious in looking at new research results, develop 
areas of specialization, and must try to leverage the public's doubt on risk issues (Levine, 
1999). 
Risk issues always compete with other newsworthy issues for the mass media to 
cover. To a journalist, the higher the risk, the higher the news value (Levine, 1999). This is 
perhaps why Siner and Endreny (1994) observe that the media tend to focus on 
"catastrophic" accidents. Hazards associated with deaths and injuries are often longer and 
more prominently covered than other related events. In many cases, the media's coverage of 
risk is selective, and journalists are criticized for poor quality reporting. 
More often, however, the media are criticized for not warning the public enough about 
a risky situation or issue or for exaggerating risks. "When it comes to risk coverage, it seems 
that the mass media can do nothing right" (Dunwoody, 1992, p. 75). For example, according 
to Fong, Rempel and Hall (1999), health reporting "has followed the same seemingly 
inexorable descent into sensationalism" (p. 174). Nevel (1999) observes that media reports 
are often shaped by advocates who seek to minimize or to maximize the risk associated with 
something. Some researchers (i.e., Petts et al., 2002) argue that the media can "amplify or 
attenuate risk only if they capture or resonate with an existing public mood, and even then 
the media are not alone in this function" (p. 23). 
According to Dunwoody (1992), journalists have limited background in science and 
mathematics. Consequently, they are deficient in their understanding of risk and risk 
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analysis, which prevents them from having their own critical opinions about these subjects. 
Journalists also lack an understanding of the scientific method. "Journalists often see science 
as deterministic —something that can be summed up by a headline and leaves little room for 
qualifiers. Science, on the other hand, is fundamentally based on the principle that nothing is 
certain" (Tao, 1999, p. 1). Journalists also seldom provide in-depth descriptions of a given 
subject but instead emphasize events. 
The media in China 
To understand how China's and Singapore's media covered the SARS crisis, a review 
of literature on the two countries' media system and media-government relationship is 
helpful. 
The government's control of the media is one of the major characteristics of China's 
political system, and this situation has not fundamentally changed in recent years. To many, 
the 2003 SARS crisis "highlights the media conundrum the Chinese government faces as 
well as their erratic methods of dealing with it" (Furrow, 2003, p. 1) . 
Unlike in democratic countries where news media industries are relatively 
independent of government control, in China, the government owns all news agencies and 
has monopoly power over the press. The government controls the media through 
administrative sanctions and policies. Journalists who violate government regulations are 
warned or even put in prison. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (2004), by 
the end of 2004, 42 journalists were in jail in the country.. 
The central concept that underlines the government's control over the media is the 
"Party principle." By virtue of this principle, the media accept the Party's leadership, abide 
by the Party's organizational rules (including its press policies), and propagate its programs, 
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policies, and directives (Zhao, 1998). 
Despite strict adherence to this principle, the Chinese media, Chang (1994) observes, 
have undergone subtle and significant changes over the past 20 years. He notes that the 
media system in China has gradually transformed itself from a pure mouthpiece to an 
"amalgamation of various identities, including that of a social knowledge producer" (p. 56). 
He observes that in 2001, Chinese national TV finally behaved like a real news resource 
when it showed live and almost uncensored coverage of the war on Iraq. 
Left largely uncensored, Chinese Internet sites and Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) 
also help erode the stranglehold of the Party-monitored media. As such, the Internet is 
expected to break the monopoly of the traditional media system and lead to a greater 
openness and free flow of information. Aware of this, the government has began developing 
a censorship system for the Internet, so that today it is able to block websites, including those 
with pornographic content and those with news from many foreign sources, especially from 
Chinese citizens overseas. 
The media in Singapore 
Singapore's foremost modern-day leader, Lee Kuan Yew, once pronounced that 
"freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to the overriding 
needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primary purposes of an elected government" 
(Lee, 1998). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the media have also been under state 
control since the Lee's People's Action Party took control of the government in 1959 (Wong, 
2001). 
The Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) owns all of Singapore's newspapers and the 
Media Corporation of Singapore (MCS) controls the broadcasting media. 1VICS is solely 
17 
owned by the government and SPH is partially under private management. Censorship in 
Singapore is undertaken by the Ministry of Information and the Arts. The state also passed a 
law restricting Internet publication in 1996. Media groups can be closed down and journalists 
may be put in prison if they violate Party policies. 
According to Chu and Wong (1999), the Singapore media are also subject to 
government restrictions in the form of media laws, censorship and codes of practice. Under 
the country's Newspaper and Printing Press Act (NPPA), passed in 1974 and amended in 
1986, the government could restrict the circulation of any publication, including foreign 
periodicals. Though it is widely held that the media are under tight control, the government 
does not admit to this, claiming that Singapore hosts the largest contingent of international 
media organizations and bureaus in the world. Despite this boast, the government puts an 
even tighter rein on the foreign press than on the local one. 
Like China, however, this stranglehold on the media has been loosened by advances 
in information technology. As a result, government censorship is not as effective as many 
have been observed a decade ago (Chu and Wong, 1999). 
The People s Daily is the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China. AlI 
stories published in the People's Daily must be approved for circulation by the Central 
Propaganda Department. As an organ of the Communist Party, the newspaper often provides 
direct information about the policies and viewpoints of the Party. In addition, editorials in the 
People's .Daily are regarded as fairly authoritative statements of government policy. 
The Straits Times is the largest and most dominant English-language paper in 
Singapore with a circulation of around 400,000 daily. It is generally recognized as one of the 
most outstanding English-language newspapers in the Far East. The paper is owned by the 
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Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). Even under government censorship, the Straits Times 
strives to be an authoritative newspaper. Compared to the People's Daily, the Straits Times is 
said to function under more democratic circumstances and has fewer restrictions on news 
coverage. 
Framing theory 
According to Gamson (1989), news reporting is more like telling a story about the 
world than presenting information to the public even though factual elements are included in 
the stories. Because news stories are considered to be products of journalists' perceptions of 
the world (Coffman, 1974), journalists are able to "frame" a story or issue for their 
audiences. According to Entman (1993), the process of framing includes selection and 
salience: "To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient 
in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p. 
52). 
Vreese (2005) viewed framing as a process, and frames have several locations in this 
process. Frames can reside in the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. The 
process of framing includes frame-building, frame-setting and individual and societal level 
consequences of framing (D' Angelo, 2002). 
The framing of events or news affects how the public perceives the news or events. 
Different frames of the same issue or event might cause the same issue or event to be 
understood in different ways (Gandy, 2001). Framing analysis thus provides a way to 
understand how the mass media construct messages and people's perception of these 
messages (Miller and Riechert, 2001). 
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Framing studies are related to the general body of research on agenda-setting, gate 
keeping and priming. Both agenda-setting and framing focus on the link between the public's 
perception of the news and public policy issues in the news (Semetko and valkenburg, 
2000). Indeed, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997} defined framing as second-level agenda-
setting. However, while agenda-setting deals with the salience of issues, framing studies are 
also concerned with "what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk" 
about issues in the news (Pan and Kosicki, 1993). 
Media frames 
Scheufele (1.999) distinguishes between media frames and individual frames. 
Previous studies have suggested that five factors influence how journalists frame an issue or 
event: social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest 
groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists 
(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Researchers have also examined media frames as either an 
independent variable or a dependent variable (Scheufele, 1999). Scheufele further describes a 
process model of framing composed of framing building, framing setting, individual-level 
effects of framing and the link between individual frames and media frames. 
Entman (1993) suggested that frames can be identified by "the presence or absence of 
certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotypical images, sources of information and sentences 
that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments" (p. 52). Semetko and 
Valkenburg (2000) posit that news stories usually contain five frames: conflict, 
responsibility, economic consequences, morality and human interest. 
Researchers have also examined the link between power relations and media frames. 
According to Edelman (1993), authorities and pressure groups can use the mass media to 
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construct certain frames and support their interests. As such, framing is central to the 
production of hegemonic meanings resulting from ideological struggles and contests. 
This study aims to compare how the People's Daily and the Straits Times framed 
SARS as a national issue. Entman (1993) identified five traits of media texts that set a certain 
frame: (1) importance judgments; (2) identification with potential victims; (3) agency; (4) 
categorization or choice of labels for the incident; and (4) generalizations to a broader 
national context. A few studies have attempted to understand how the media framed the 
SARS epidemic. 
Choi (2006) analyzed the media coverage of the SARS epidemic in Singapore and 
China and examined the relationship between political agenda and media frames. Unlike 
traditional agenda-setting studies, this study examined the public agenda when the media 
fails to give adequate coverage in its media agenda. 
Examining the online news coverage of SARS, Lee (2005) found that although local 
incidents were mainly reported, these incidents were explained in terms of a global health 
crisis. Tian and Stewart (2005) compared how CNN and the 'BBC covered the SARS crisis 
and found similarities and differences in their framing. CNN and BBC framed SARS from a 
global perspective and focused on the effect of SARS on public health and the medical 
system. However, CNN was more concerned with the economic dimension of the crisis. 
Huang and Leung (2005) examined how SARS was covered by the Western news 
media, specifically looking at whether China and Vietnam were presented differently in three 
international newspapers. The findings show that Vietnam was portrayed more positively 
than China. Also studying two Western newspapers, Oh and Zhou (2004) found that the 
Toronto Star used the conflict, responsibility, economic consequences, and human interest 
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frames more than the World Journal, while the World Journal relied more on the use of the 
ri sk frame. 
Research Questions 
Based on the foregoing literature, the following research questions are posed: 
Research Question 1: How ri ch in information were the two newspapers' coverage 
of SARS? How do they compare in terms of information richness? 
Research Question 2: To what extent did the two governments and the two 
newspapers warned or reassured their respective publics about SARS? 
Research question 3: What were the dominant sources of information cited in the 
two newspapers' SARS-related reports? How do they compare in terms of sources cited? 
Research question 4: What frames did the two newspapers use to inform the public 
about SARS? Is there a difference between the People's Daily and the Straight Times in 




The research design 
This study aims to (1) determine the "information richness" of the newspapers' 
SARS coverage, (2) ascertain the extent to which the two governments released information 
that warned or reassured their people about the epidemic, (3) determine the dominant 
information sources used in the news reports, (4) describe what frames the two newspapers, 
China's People's Daily and Singapore's Straits Times, used to explain SARS to their 
respective publics, and (5) determine the difference between the People's Daily and the 
Straits Times in the frames they used to cover SARS. To gather data for this study, a content 
analysis of the People's Daily and the Straits Times from November 2002 to July 2003 was 
conducted. 
Content analysis is a method used to study communication in a systematic, objective, 
and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables (Wimmer and Dominick, 
2000). Holsti (1969) defines content analysis as a process "in which communication content 
is transformed, through the objective and systematic application of categorization rules, into 
data that can be summarized and compared" (p. 3). It is an appropriate data gathering method 
for this study that aims to compare and contrast the coverage of two newspapers from two 
countries with agovernment-controlled media system. Because the study also aims to 
decipher the risk communication strategies deployed by the two governments to combat 
SARS, content analysis provided a good venue with which the nature, characteristic and 
intensity of BARS coverage can be explored. 
The sample and the unit of analysis 
23 
News stories about SARS from the People's Daily and the Straits Times, the 
newspapers-of-record in China and Singapore, respectively, were analyzed. The People's 
Daily is the official newspaper of the Communist Parry of China and is published worldwide 
with a circulation of four million. The Straits Times is the dominant English-language paper 
in Singapore, with a circulation of around 400,000 daily. 
The period of analysis covers November 1, 2002, the month when SARS was first 
detected in China, until July 7, 2003, one week after the WH(J declared China SARS-free. 
The People's Daily is a Chinese language newspaper. SARS translates to "fei dian" in 
Chinese. News stories from the People's Daily were collected from the paper's web-based 
archives (http://search.peopledaily.com.cn/) using "fei dian" as the search term. "SARS" was 
used as the search term in the headlines and lead paragraphs of all SARS and SARS-related 
news stories published in the Straits Times retrieved from LexisNexis. News stories less than 
200 words in length, photo items, news briefs and editorials were not included in the sample. 
The search yielded a total of 2,748 articles from the People's Daily and 1,580 articles 
from the Straits Times over a period of eight months. To be representative of the entire time 
frame, a sample of 1,000 articles for each newspaper was selected following a stratified 
random sampling technique. In the study, the date of publication was used as the 
stratification factor so that at least one story each day was picked from each newspaper each 
day starting November 1, 2002 until July 7, 2003. To do this, a list of all SARS stories 
retrieved was grouped according to date of publication. At least one story was selected from 
each available date using a random start. To be more representative of the population, the 
number of stories per month was ascertained for each newspaper. Then, a specific number of 
stories for each date was chosen, proportional to the number of articles published per month, 
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until a sample size of 1,000 stories per paper was reached. 
Variables and their measurement 
Information richness refers to the quantity of SARS information present in each 
news story. Each complete story was analyzed to determine whether it: 
(1) explained what SARS is (SARS) 
(2) explained how SARS gets transmitted among humans (TRANSMIT); 
(3) mentioned the symptoms associated with SARS (SYMP); 
(4) mentioned the risks of contracting SARS (RISK); 
(5) provided information about how people can protect themselves against SARS 
(PROTECT); 
(6) provided information where people can go for assistance (HELP); 
(7) mentioned or implied that SARS was under effective control (COle1TROL); and 
(8) indicated that the government can effectively handle the epidemic (GOVT). 
Each of the above items was represented as binary dummy variables. The presence of 
each information item was coded 1. Its absence was coded 0. To measure information 
richness, the presence of each item was counted (0-8). 
The extent to which an article warned or reassured the public about the dangers 
associated with SARS, a quantitative variable, was measured by counting the number of 
times these two types of messages were mentioned in each news report. Then, these were 
added up to get the sum for each of the two newspapers. 
Information source refers to the attributions of general knowledge present in the 
stories from a variety of sources. Each source cited in the report was coded as being: 
(1) a local health expert, such as a medical doctor, health specialist or scientist; 
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(2) a government official, such as the minister of health or a local government official. 
This includes all government office-holders other than a medical or health expert; 
(3) an international health expert or scientist, such as a specialist from the WHO and 
other foreign governments, agencies and bodies; 
(4) ordinary citizens; 
(5) media reports, such as local or international media outlets, including television, 
Internet websites, radio programs and reports, and other newspapers, magazines, 
brochures or any printed product; 
(6) others. This source category includes every source not listed above. 
The first three information sources cited in the story were identified and coded. 
A frame is a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to events 
(Garnson and Modifliani, 1987). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) identified five frames used 
frequently in news stories: conflict, responsibility, economic consequences, morality, and 
human interest frames. This was used as the initial list of potential frames that can be found 
in the stories. However, this did not preclude the addition or subtraction of frame items from 
this original list. The complete article was analyzed in this study to deterrr~ine these 
overarching patterns of SARS discourse. Each story was analyzed to determine what other 
frames may be present. because a story may contain more than one frame, each article was 
analyzed to determine the three most dominant frames it exhibited. Frames, like risk 
messages and information sources, were treated as categorical variables. 
Intercoder reliabi~~ty 
Coding was done by four graduate students. Two students whose native language is 
Chinese coded all articles from the People's Daily. The other two students coded news 
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stories from the Straits Times. Prior to the actual coding, they practiced coding on-line SARS 
stories from the Global Times, aChinese-language newspaper and the 1~ew York Times, an 
English-language newspaper. In addition, they read news stories about SARS to get familiar 
with the coding categories. Inter-coder reliability for the frame and risk messages variables 
was calculated using Holsti's formula, 
2M 
Reliability e 
N 1 + N2 
where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two coders agree, and Nl and N2 
are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively (Wimmer 
and Dominick, 2000). 
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CHAPTER 4. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A total of 2,000 stories published in the two newspapers (1,000 from the People's 
Daily and 1,000 from the Straits Times) from November 1, 2002 to July 7, 2003 were 
analyzed in this study. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of stories in the People's Daily and the 
Straits Times over afive-month period. It demonstrates that majority of the stories about 
SARS were published in the People's Daily from May to June 2003. In the Straits Times, the 
peak period of coverage occurred from April to May 2003. 












® The People's Daily 
The straits Times 
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As Figure 1 exhibits, the People's Daily did not report its first SARS story until 
April 2003, although the cumulative number of clinically confirmed cases in China was 
already 1,153 by the end of March. On the other hand, the Straits Times reported its first 
SARS story on March 18, 2003, five days after the first SARS case in the country was 
diagnosed on March 13. Therefore, it can be said that the Chinese government and media 
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chose to "cover up" the epidemic while the Singapore government and media informed the 
public immediately. 
Critics have pointed out that because the Chinese government intentionally withheld 
information, SARS spread faster throughout China and all over the world. Moreover, the 
initial failure to inform the public about the disease fostered widespread anxiety and 
speculation. On the other hand, Singapore informed the public promptly and honestly, which 
helped the government gain credibility and public trust. 
According to Lundgren and McMakin (2004), risk communication should begin as 
soon as the risk has been identified and should progress as new information becomes 
available. However, there is no simple rule on when risk information should be released. In 
the case of rapidly evolving events that characterize an outbreak, governments and the media 
are likely to face criticism no matter what (Sandman, 2005). Generally, early is better, even 
in cases of uncertainty because: "(1) Early release of information sets the pace for the 
resolution of the problem because communicators can better control the accuracy of 
information, (2) strategists are more apt to earn public trust if they release information 
promptly, (3) people are more likely to overestimate the risk if information is withheld, and 
(4) people are entitled to information that affects their lives" (Sandman, 2005, p. 1). 
Research Question 1 
How rich in information were the two newspapers' coverage of SARS ?How do they compare 
in terms of information richness ? 
In this study, "information richness" refers to the quantity of SARS and SARS-
related information present in each news story. Table 1 details the number of specific 
information about the disease mentioned in the People's Daily and the Straits Times, 
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including what SARS is, how SARS gets transmitted, the symptoms associated with SARS, 
the risks of contracting SARS, how people can protect themselves against SARS, where 
people can go for assistance, whether the SARS epidemic was under control and whether the 
government is handling the situation effectively. 
Table 1 shows that the most frequently mentioned SARS information in both 
newspapers were the government's handling of the disease (n=705), where people can go for 
assistance (n=540), and how people can protect themselves against SARS (n=483). These 
were followed by information on how SARS is transmitted (n=425), the risk of contracting 
SARS (n=370), and the symptoms of the disease (n=313). The least mentioned information 
was about the disease itself (n=121), as only 6.1 percent of the 2,000 articles examined 
explained this new and relatively unknown malady. 
As the first epidemic that emerged in 21St century, SARS was also the first truly air-
borne epidemic in history as air travel carried it worldwide in weeks. Facing a new disease, 
one of the media's tasks was to provide all kinds of information about it. Table 1 shows that 
the two newspapers provided relatively little information about SARS, the symptoms 
associated with it, and the risk of contracting it. 
Table 1 also shows that the People's Daily had a slightly greater percentage of 
information regarding SARS (6.4%) and how people could protect themselves against it 
(25.8%), compared to 5.7% and 22.5% of the same information, respectively, in the Straits 
Times. ®n the other hand, the Straits Times provided much more information than the 
People's Daily on how SARS gets transmitted, the symptoms associated with SARS, the 
risks of getting infected with SARS, and where people can go for assistance. 
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There was a vast difference in the number of articles that implied or mentioned that 
SARS was under control. In the People's Daily, 55 articles said so, most of them appearing 
during the initial coverage and near the end of the coverage. Only 15 of such articles 
appeared in the Strait Times, all of which came near the end of the coverage. Moreover, 577 
articles from the People's Daily mentioned or implied that the government could effectively 
handle the crisis, compared to only 128 stories implying the same in the Straits Times. 
According to the chi-square test results in Table 2, there was a significant difference 
between the two papers in terms of the information they contained regarding how SARS is 
transmitted (x2=3 8.15, p=.000, df=1), the symptoms of the disease (x2=9.44, p=.002, df=1), 
the risks related to the disease (x2=47.75, p=.000, df=1), where people can g0 for help 
(x2=6.34, p=.012, df=1), whether the epidemic is under control (x2=23.69, p=.000, df=1), 
and the government's handling of the disease (x2=441.63, p=.000, df=1). The Times 
contained more information about how the disease gets transmitted, its symptoms, the risks it 
engenders, and where people can seek assistance, obviously outperforming its Chinese 
counterpart on these aspects. The Daily, however, had a demonstrably larger number of 
stories that claimed the epidemic is under control and that the government is handling the 
situation well. 
As shown also in Table 2, no significant difference was not found in the two 
newspapers' content about the disease (x2=0.431, p=.511, df=1), and how to protect people 
from the disease (x2=2.97, p=.085, df=1). 
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Table 1. Number of SARS-related information in the two newspapers (N=2,000). 
Specific information Paper n Total count 
The disease The Daily 64 121 
The Times 57 
How it is transmitted The Daily 156 425 
The Times 269 
Symptoms of the disease The Daily 132 313 
The Times 181 
Risks related to the disease The Daily 125 370 
The Times 245 
How to protect people from the 
disease 
The Daily 25 8 483 
The Times 225 
Where people can go for help The Daily 245 540 
The Times 295 
Is the epidemic under control The Daily 55 70 
The Times 15 
Government handling of the disease The Daily 577 705 
The Times 128 
Table 2. Results ofchi-square tests showing the difference between the People 's Daily and 
the Straits Times in terms of information richness. 
Specific information Paper n Pearson chi- 
square value 
df Asymp. Sig 
(2-sided) 
The disease The Daily 64 .431 1 .511 
The Times 57 
How it is transmitted The Daily 156 38.152 1 .000 
The Times 269 
Symptoms of the disease The Daily 132 9.445 1 .002 
The Times 181 
Risks related to the disease The Dozily 125 47.753 1 .000 
The Times 245 
How to protect people from 
the disease 
The Daily 258 2.973 1 .085 
The Times 225 
Where people can go for 
help 
The Daily 245 6.342 1 .012 
The Times 295 
Is the epidemic under control The Dozily 55 23.686 1 .000 
The Times 15 
Government handling of the 
disease 
The Daily 577 441.635 1 .000 
The Times 128 
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Over the course of a week since the People's Daily reported its first SARS story, the 
paper repeatedly mentioned that the SARS epidemic was effectively under control. In reality, 
the epidemic has already spread to Beijing when the first report was released on April 2. 
Although officials acknowledged that the disease was relatively unknown, they remained 
silent about the extent and severity of the outbreak. At some level, the government 
underestimated the seriousness of the situation and believed it can handle the crisis 
effectively (I~Cuang, 2003). On April 2, Premier Wen Jiabao chaired an executive meeting of 
the State Council to discuss the issue but again insisted that the outbreak was effectively 
under control. A week later, Premier Wen was forced to tell the nation that "the situation is 
grave." 
Considering China's resulting economic losses, the price of lying and deception 
was indeed costly. The long period of dishonesty allowed SARS to spread far and wide. As 
unsubstantiated rumors filled the information vacuum, in the eyes of its own public and the 
lnternatlonal C0111I11unity, the government lost credibility. 
Research Question 2 
To what extent did the two newspapers warned or reassured their respective publics about 
the epidemic in their reports ? 
Following the results of RQl, Table 3 shows the number of times messages that 
warned or reassured the public were detected in the news reports. It indicates that the 
People's Daily contained more messages that reassured the public that the epidemic is being 
effectively dealt with by the government. On the other hand, the Straits Times contained 
more warnings. This suggests that the two governments applied vastly different risk 
communication strategies in handling the outbreak. 
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The independent samples t-tests (Table 3) conducted to determine if the two papers 
differed in this regard show a significant difference in terms of the risk messages they chose 
to disseminate to their respectively publics through the media (t=2.56, p=.~10, df=1956). 
Table 3. Number of messages that warned or reassured the public about the epidemic in the 
two newspapers (N=2,000). 





114 330 .7740 .91420 2.565 1956066 .010 
The Straits 
Times 
272 202 .6760 .78971 
According to Lanard and Sandman (2003), during an evolving crisis, the most 
important risk communication recommendation is to avoid over-reassuring people. That is, it 
is better to warn the public than to drum up false confidences. At this stage, people needed to 
be more knowledgeable about the uncertainties and the potential risks rather than be 
bombarded with unsubstantiated claims of assurance. For example, it was vital for the public 
to know that the SARS virus can be transmitted through the air and that patients can die 
within a few days if left untreated. Both the People's Daily and the Straits Times treated the 
epidemic as a serious disease. However, compared to the Straits Times, the People's Daily 
claimed more often that the disease was not a serious one and that the risk of contracting 
SARS was low. 
Both the Straits Times and the People's Daily mentioned similar measures to protect 
the public against SARS, including wearing masks, washing hands and not sharing towels. 
These measures, however, were more frequently mentioned in the Straits Times than in the 
People's Daily. Moreover, more Singapore government officials, including the president and 
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the premier, went on national media to persuade the public to follow these infection 
prevention measures. 
From April 10 to April 17, the sources cited in the People's Daily suggested that 
people should calm down and go about their normal every day lives. Residents in Beijing 
were encouraged to go out instead of staying at home. For example, one article said: "It is 
ridiculous to avoid going to the hospital and other public places. People don't need to worry 
too much about the epidemic...It is not easy to contract SARS" (Titan, 2003). In reality, at 
that time, the epidemic was already spreading fast all over the country and the best way to 
prevent spread was to isolate and quarantine already affected individuals. 
Both governments demonstrated confidence in controlling the SARS epidemic and 
both realized they were facing not only a public health problem but also a political and 
economic crisis. According to the People's Daily, the Chinese government cooperated fully 
with the international community to contain SARS and that the WHO was satisfied with the 
Chinese government's efforts on this regard. The Daily reports also stressed that the Chinese 
government always places the people's health and safety above everything else, and had 
provided many effective anti-SARS assistance measures. In contrast, the Singapore 
government officials shared feelings of anxiety with its own public while it outlined the 
measures it has taken to contain the outbreak. Unlike the Daily, it did not make any blatant 
statement that the epidemic was under control. 
Research Question 3. 
What were the dominant sources of information cited in the two newspapers' SARS-related 
reports ?How do they compare in terms of sources cited ? 
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Because more than one source was often used in a story, each article was analyzed to 
determine the three dominant sources to which first-hand information was attributed. Table 4 
shows the distribution of six sources cited in the two newspapers. As shown in Table 4, the 
most frequently cited sources in both papers were government officials and local health 
reports (n= 1,983); these were followed by other media sources (n=$36). the least frequently 
cited sources were ordinary citizens (n=325) and international health experts (n=254). 
The findings of this study echo those of other studies that examined the media 
coverage of outbreaks in different countries. These studies show that journalists generally 
rely heavily on official government sources in fashioning their news reports. This is 
especially true during a crisis that entails high risks (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992). 
Another major news source was local health reports. Although the SARS epidemic 
was a worldwide disaster, the two newspapers focused mainly on local health news (n=945), 
eschewing those from international sources (n=254). This implies that both newspapers were 
more concerned with their local situations than the global ramifications of the epidemic. 
The People's Daily cited government official sources most frequently (28.7%), 
followed by other media sources (25.5%). The Straits Times referenced local health reports 
(28.4°Io), government sources (28.2%), and other media sources (20.4°Io) ralost often. In both 
newspapers, the least often cited sources were international health experts and local citizens. 
Tables 5 to 7 outline the results of the chi-square tests conducted to test the difference 
between the two papers in source use. 
Source 1: As shown in Table 5, there was a significant difference between the two 
newspapers in the first dominant source cited (x2=75.42, p=.000, df=5). In the People's 
Daily, the most frequently cited source was government officials, department or unit, 
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followed by the local health reports and other media sources. The least frequently cited 
sources were ordinary citizens and international health experts. In the Straits Times, the most 
frequently cited source was local health reports, followed by government t®fficials and other 
media sources. As in the People's Daily, the least frequently cited sources in the Straits 
Times were ordinary citizens and international health experts. 
Source 2: As shown in Table 6, the People's Daily and the Straits Times also differed 
in terms of the second most dominant source of information cited (x2=35.68, p=.000, df=5). 
The most frequently cited source in the People's Daily was other media sources, followed by 
local health reports and government officials. The least frequently cited sources were 
international health experts and ordinary citizens. On the other hand, the most frequently 
cited source in the Straits Times was other media sources, followed by government officials 
and local health reports. The least frequently cited sources were the same as in the People's 
Daily. 
Source 3: As can be seen in Table 7, the two papers also differed significantly in 
terms of the third most cited information source (x2=35.09, p=.000, df=5). The most 
frequently cited sources in the People's Daily were international health experts and 
government officials, followed by other media sources. The least frequently cited were 
ordinary citizens and local health reports. On the other hand, the most frequently used 
sources in the Straits Times were international health experts and other media sources. The 
least cited sources were local health reports and ordinary citizens. 
Table 4. The most frequently cited sources of information in the two newspapers' coverage 
of SARS. 
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Total The People's Daily The Straits Times 
N ~ % of total ~ N % of total 
Local health reports 945 428 23.4 517 28.4 
Government officials or 
agencies 
1,038 524. 28.7 514. 28.2 
International health experts 254 139. 7.6 115 6.3~ 
Citizens 325 139 7.6 186 10.2 
Media 836 465 25.5 371 20.4 
Others 247 129 7.1 118 6.6 
Table 5. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
first source cited. 
Source 1 Paper N Total 
Local health reports The Daily 285 671 
The Times 386 
Government officials or 
agencies 
The Daily 367 702 
The Times 335 
International health experts The Daily 80 154 
The Times 74 
Citizens The Daily 26 91 
The Times 65 
Media The Daily 225 336 
The Times 111 
Others The Daily 17 46 
The Times 29 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 75.418 5 .000 
Likelihood ratio 76.845 5 .000 
Linear-by-linear association 22.759 1 .000 
N of valided cases 2000 
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Table 6. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
second source cited. e 
Source 2 Paper N Total 
Local health reports The Daily 125 254 
The Times 129 
Government officials or 
agencies 
The Daily 94 266 
The Times 172 
International health experts The Daily 34 45 
The Times 11 
Citizens The Daily 67 169 
The Times 102 
Media The Daily 192 428 
The Times 236 
Others The Daily 87 162 
The Times 75 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 35.684 5 .000 
Likelihood ratio 36.318 5 .000 
Linear-by-linear association 1.145 1 .285 
N of valided cases 1324 
Table 7. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
third source cited. 
Source 3 Paper N Total 
Local health reports The Daily 18 20 
The Times 2 
Government officials or 
agencies 
The Daily 63 ~ 70 
The Times 7 
International health experts The Daily 79 109 -_ 
The Times 30 
Citizens The Daily 11 30 
The Times 19 
Media The Daily 48 72 
The Times 24 
Others The Daily 25 39 
The Times 14 
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Table 7. continued. 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 35.088 5 .000 
Likelihood ratio 35.918 5 .000 
Linear-by-linear association 14.974 1 .000 
N of valided cases 340 
Research Question 4. 
What frames did the two newspapers use to inform the public about SARS? Is there a 
difference between the People's Daily and the Straight Times in terms of the frames they 
used in covering the SARS epidemic? 
Because a story may contain more than one frame, each article was analyzed to 
determine the three most dominant frames it exhibited. Table 7 shows the frequency 
distribution of the seven frames identified in both newspapers. From the original list of 
frames culled from Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), two more frames were identified: the 
health and political frames. As shown in Table 8, the most frequently used frame was the 
health frame (n=1,401), followed by the economic frame (n=535). The use of the ri sk and 
responsibility frames was the same for both newspapers (n=489). The least used was political 
(n=316), morality (n=365), and the human interest frames (n=382). 
The health frame was the most dominant frame found in both newspapers, focusing 
on the effect of SARS on public health and the medical systems. The frame revolves around 
the new disease, how people can protect themselves against SARS, how the disease gets 
transmitted, the ri sk of contracting SARS, and where to go for help. 
The economic frame was the second most dominant frame detected. This frame 
stresses dramatic economic effects on Singapore, China and the world. In 2003, SARS 
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infected 8,436 people in 30 countries and killed 812 since the first case was reported in China 
on November the year before. The epidemic also had a far greater impact on the 
global economy than expected. Besides its adverse effects on direct costs for medical 
care, SARS caused worldwide social disruption and economic losses. International travel fell 
by 50 percent to 70 percent; hotel occupancy dropped more than 60 percent. According to a 
widely cited estimate by the investment firm Morgan Stanley, SARS cost the global economy 
$40 billion in 2003. 
The negative impact of SARS on the Asian economies was also evident in the report. 
Singapore's economy was hit hard, with the travel and tourism sector particularly taking 
a heavy beating. Reports showed a 67 percent decline in visitors in April, when the epidemic 
was at its peak outbreak stage. A sharp 4.3 percent drop in GDP was recorded in the 
second quarter, and GDP growth in 2003 declined by 1.1 percent. China was hit most 
heavily by the SARS epidemic in 2003. It was estimated that the economic loss caused by 
SARS was around 48 billion in US dollars. Indeed, the economic impact of the disease was 
far more serious than that of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Yangtze flood in 1998. 
Table 8 also shows that the Straits Times used more health, economic, human interest, 
risk and morality frames. Its Chinese counterpart, on the other hand, employed more political 
and responsibility frames. Compared to the People's Daily, the Straits Times focused much 
more heavily on the economic frame, especially SARS' impact on tourism. In other words, 
the Straits Times seemed to be more concerned with the economic dimension of the SARS 
crisis than the Daily. 
In general, the Straits Times also made more use of the human interest frame than the 
People's Daily. In the People's Daily, the human interest frame mostly dealt with themes 
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such as "BARS-fighting heroes," referring to the doctors and other medical personnel who 
took care of BARS patients. However, in the Straits Times, the human interest frame dealt 
more specifically with individual BARS cases. The Straits Times used risk frames more 
frequently than the Daily. It was also evident that the People's Daily was more careful in 
covering SARS-related risks. Compared to the Singapore government, the Chinese 
government created relatively little alarm and reassured the public more frequently. Tables 9 
to 11 exhibit the results of three chi-square tests conducted to test the difference between the 
two papers in frame use. 
Frame 1: Table 9 shows a significant difference between the two papers in the first 
frame used (x2=11 x.43, p=.000, df=6). In the People's Daily, the most frequently used frame 
was the health frame, followed by the political frame. A close third is the human interest 
frame. The least frequently used frames were risk and morality. In the Straits Times, the most 
dominant frame was the health frame, followed by the economic frame. The least frequently 
employed frames were the risk and political frames. 
Frame 2: The second most frequently used frame in the People's Daily was the risk 
frame, followed by the health frame and the responsibility frame. The least employed were 
the morality frame and the human interest frame. In the Straits Times, the health frame was 
the second most common frame, followed by the risk and the economic frame. The least 
discussed were the responsibility and the political frames. The results of achi-square test 
shown in Table 10 indicate that the two papers markedly differ in terms of the second frame 
they used (x2=150.~~, p=.000, df=7). 
Frame 3: The third most frequently used frame in the People's Daily was the 
responsibility frame, followed by the risk and the morality frame. Mentioned the least were 
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the economic and the political interest frames. In the Straits Times, the third most abundantly 
used frame was the responsibility frame, followed by the morality and the risk frames. The 
least mentioned were the economic and the political frames. The chi-square test results 
shown on Table 11 indicate that the two papers differed substantially in terms of the third 
frame they used (x2=35.36, p=.000, df=7). 
Table 8. The frames used in the SARS coverage by the People's Daily and the Straits Times. 
Frame Total The People's Daily The Straits Times 
N % of total N % of total 
Health 1,401 657 22 744 36.7 
Economic 535 170 5.7 365 18 _ 
Political 316 130 7.7 186 4.2 
Risk 489 261 8.7 228 11.2 
Human Interest 382 ~ 174 5.8 208 10.3 
Responsibility 489 310 10.4 179 8.9 
Morality 365 146 4.9 219 10.8 
Table 9. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
first frame used. 
Frame 1 Paper Total 
The People's Daily The Straits Times 
Health 483 510 993 
Economic 103 216 319 
Political 139 35 174 
Risk 40 14 54 
Human interest 105 98 203 
Responsibility 83 66 149 . 
Morality 47 61 108 
Total 1,000 1,000 2,000 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 119.438(a) 6 .000 
Likelihood ratio 125.226 6 A00 
Linear-by-linear association 4.205 1 .040 
N of valid cases 2,000 
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Table 10. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
second frame used. 
Frame 2 Paper Total 
The People's Daily The Straits Times 
Health 163 201 364 
Economic 62 147 209 
Political 82 35 117 
Risk 171 175 346 
Human interest 54 74 128 
Responsibility 152 53 
_ 
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Morality 50 108 15 8 
Total 734 793 1,549 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 150.891(a) 7 .000 
Likelihood ratio 163.453 7 .000 
Linear-by-linear association 3.836 1 .050 
N of valid cases 1,549 
Table 11. Chi-square test showing the difference between the two newspapers in terms of the 
third frame used. 
Frame 3 ~ Paper Total 
The People's Daily The Straits Times 
Health ~ 11 33 44 
Economic 5 2 7 
Political 9 16 25 
Risk 50 39 89 
Human interest 15 36 51 
Responsibility 75 61 136 
Morality 49 50 99 
Total 214 237 461 
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson chi-square 35.365(a) 7 .000 
Likelihood ratio 40.049 7 .000 
Linear-by-linear association 1.502 1 .220 




In the last two decades of the 20th century, new diseases emerged at the rate of one 
per year, and this trend is expected to continue (Woolhouse and Dye, 2001). People can 
reasonably expect, therefore, that SARS is not the last epidemic that will create a worldwide 
crisis. The countries that bore the brunt of the epidemic definitely differed in terms of their 
health monitoring and regulatory mechanisms, their capacity to extend immediate assistance, 
and their ability to communicate to their publics about the disease. The lessons on effective 
risk communication they learned as they struggled with the epidemic, therefore, are worth 
documenting in preparation for the next threat. This task is crucial as risk communication 
experts must construct and cumulatively build an evidence-based, field-tested body of 
guidelines to promote the public health goal of rapid outbreak control with the least possible 
disruption to society. 
This study analyzed two newspapers, the Straits Times and the People's Daily, to 
determine the risk communication strategies employed by their respective governments in 
dealing with SARS. The results provide empirical evidence to the common observation that, 
compared to China, Singapore offered afirst-rate communication strategy with features 
strongly associated with communication effectiveness. Although both newspapers are under 
strict government censorship and directly reflect their government's stance on issues of 
national importance, they responded to the SARS crisis quite differently. Indeed, the findings 
of this study indicate in many ways that Singapore was a test case of outbreak 
communication best practices through the media. 
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First, this study finds that the Chinese government obscured the true national situation 
at the beginning of the outbreak. Although the first SARS case was recorded as early as 
November 2002, the first article about the disease did not appear in the People's Daily until 
April 10, 2003, a full five months after it was initially confirmed. As the nation underwent a 
health ordeal, the government continuously misled the public through media reports stating 
that the epidemic was under control. In contrast, the Singapore government released 
information immediately after diagnosing its first SARS case. 
According to Powell and Leiss (1997), a ri sk communication vacuum is always 
untenable because the absence of credible information often foments rumors and speculations 
that can seriously amplify or attenuate the objective risks. Based on years of experience 
worldwide as a risk communication expert, Sandman (2003) reminds communication 
practitioners -that in a public health crisis, "the credibility of those in charge may well 
translate into people's trust in official information and compliance with official instructions, 
and thus into lives saved or lost" (p. 1). The parameters of trust are established in the 
outbreak's first official announcement. This message's timing, candor and 
comprehensiveness may make it "the most important of all outbreak communications" 
(WHO, 2005, p. 3). People are more likely to overestimate the risk if information is withheld. 
Evidence also shows that the longer officials withhold worrisome information, the more 
frightening the .information will seem when it is revealed, especially if the revelation is done 
by outside sources. 1[n downplaying the risks, therefore, the Chinese government delayed 
outbreak control, undermined public trust and compliance, and unnecessarily prolonged 
economic, social and political turmoil. 
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Second, the Straits Times coverage was not only early, it was also characterized by 
more information. This richness in content is displayed in terms of how the newspaper 
abundantly handled such information items as how the disease gets transmitted, the 
symptoms of the disease, the risks related to SARS, and where people can go for help. In 
these areas, the Straits Times demonstrably outperformed its Chinese counterpart. On the 
other hand, the People's Daily contained more information about the epidemic being under 
control and the government's handling of the disease. Compared to the Singapore paper, 
therefore, the Daily offered a more Party-oriented point of view, expressing a desire to 
project an image of competence. This penchant for self-orientation, however, obscured the 
government's concern for the people's welfare. 
Studies have shown that maintaining the public's trust throughout an outbreak 
requires transparency—communication that is candid, easily understood and factually 
accurate. By providing the public with the most information about the disease, the Straits 
Times allowed people to almost experience the risk assessment and decision-making 
processes the government undertook in its efforts at outbreak control. Because of the high 
degree of transparency this mode afforded, there was a stronger incentive for government 
risk managers to be deliberative and accountable for their actions. 
Third, as a direct extension of the government's general attitude, the People's Daily's 
coverage was replete with information that reassured rather than warned people about the 
probability of contracting the disease and to convince the public of the government's position 
on SARS. Again, this practice ran contrary to expert advice (i.e., Lanard and Sandman, 2003) 
that, in dealing with an evolving crisis, it is best to avoid over reassuring the public. In 
contrast, the Singapore newspaper featured more precautionary measures, urging citizens to 
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take steps that will keep them from harm, and empathizing with them during a prolonged 
period of uncertainty. This practice is in accord with the tenet that risk communication 
messages should include information about what the public can do to make themselves safer. 
This affords people a sense of control over their own health and safety, which in turn allows 
them to react to the risk with more reasoned responses. 
Fourth, the frames gleaned from the news reports indicate that the two newspapers 
(and their respective governments) focused mainly on the local health situation although 
SARS was clearly a disaster of global proportions. This finding supports the results of Lee 
(2005) who examined the online news coverage of SARS in several Asian countries and 
found that the newspapers mainly reported on local incidents compared to the international 
ones. This finding is perhaps due to the overwhelming local situations that dominated the 
coverage. It is also demonstrates that Asians, like the Americans, have a general propensity 
and a natural curiosity to understand what is happening "within their backyards" as a 
characteristic of what news gatekeepers call incidents that have inherent "news values." 
Fifth, Singapore's Straits Times relied more on the use of health, economic, human 
interest, risk and morality frames while the People's Daily employed more political and 
responsibility frames. The Times focused much more heavily on the economic frame than the 
Daily even though the Chinese economic losses due to SARS was by far larger than 
Singapore's. The Chinese government's reluctance to pay attention to economic losses is 
perhaps a result of its strongly held belief that economic indices of growth are a direct 
reflection of the government's ability to manage the country. This frame was very much 
downplayed by the Chinese newspaper to diminish the backlash. The dominance of the 
political and responsibility frames in the Daily's coverage exemplifies how authorities and 
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pressure groups can use the mass media to construct certain frames and support their 
interests. This ability makes framing a central practice in the production of hegemonic 
meanings resulting from ideological struggles and contests (Edelman, 1993). 
Sixth, in the combined coverage of the two newspapers, the most frequently cited 
sources were the government officials and local health reports while the least often cited 
sources were citizens and international health experts. This study also found that the two 
newspapers relied heavily on government sources. According to Dunwoody and Peters 
(1992), reporters usually depend heavily on official government sources in their news 
reports, especially during a crisis that entails high risks. On the other hand, the dependence 
on government and official sources is understandable because both newspapers are 
mouthpieces of their respective governments. 
In summary, the results point to the best practices nations can follow in dealing with a 
health crisis like SARS. The content analysis findings indicate that the pattern of media's 
response to the epidemic was shaped by the institutional dynamics of both countries' political 
system (Huang, 2003). As China has experienced, risk communication failures are costly. 
The lessons learned from such an experience, therefore, bear repeating: (1) do not over-
reassure the public, (2) release information immediately, (3) do not hide bad news; (4) work 
toward maximum transparency. 
For risk managers and public health officials who use the media to communicate to 
citizens, such lessons are expected to enhance their capacities for crisis management. For 
journalists and health reporters, these lessons provide guidelines to promote public resilience 
and guide appropriate public participation to support the rapid containment of an outbreak, 
thus limiting morbidity and mortality. In addition, effective risk communication minimizes 
4~ . 
the damage to a nation's international standing, its economy, and its public health 
infrastructure. 
The results of this study also provide empirical evidence that communication 
expertise has become as essential to outbreak control as epidemiological training and 
laboratory analyses. 
Limitations and future directions 
This paper analyzed the content of only two newspapers in two countries affected by 
SARS. The sampling universe thus constrained the ability to generalize the results to other 
areas of the world. The study also limited its analysis to newspapers. The risk communication 
field will certainly benefit from the analysis of the content of various news media such as 
television, radio and the Internet. 
Further, this study analyzed media frames as influenced by different government 
systems that controlled the media industry. To fully understand the framing process, it is 
important to observe the impact of media frames on individual frames or the audience's 
perception of critical health issues. 
Third, this study did not provide a time series analysis of frames and sources used. 
Actually, in both Singapore and China, the SARS struggle can be divided into three distinct 
periods: the initial outbreak, the release of the WHO travel advisory, and the second 
outbreak. It would therefore be beneficial to analyze frame and source use across these three 
time periods to help assess the evolution of the content of news reports especially in periods 
of protracted crises. 
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Variable Name Variable definition Values 









First frame applied to the article 
Second frame applied to the article 
Third frame applied to the article 
The report defined or explained 
what SARS is 
The report explained how SARS 
is transmitted 
The report explained the symptoms 
associated with SARS 
Enter article ID numbex 
1 =The People's Daily 





























Coding sheet, continued 










The report mentioned the risks of 
contracting SARS 
The report told people how to 
protect themselves against SARS 
The report told people how they 
can get help 
The report mentioned or implied 
SARS is under government control 
The report indicated that 
government can effectively handle 
SARS 
Number of messages that warned 
the public 
Number of messages that warned 
the public 
First information source cited 













1 =local health report 
2 =government official 




1 =local health report 
2 =government official 
3 =international experts 
4 =citizens 
5 = medi a 
6 =others 
64 
SOURCE 3 Third information source cited 1 0 local health report 
2 o government official 
3 o international experts 
4 o citizens 
5 o media 
6 ~ others 
